The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East by Abulof, Uriel & Goldman, Ogen
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. 
ISSN: 1864–1385
The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East
Uriel Abulof, The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University and Tel Aviv University
Ogen Goldman, Political Science Department, Ashkelon Academic College, Israel
urn:nbn:de:0070- i jcv-2015149
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015
Vol. 9 (1) 2015
Focus Section:  
Xenophobic Violence 
and the Manufacture of 
Difference in Africa
Editorial (p. 3)
Xenophobic Violence and the Manufacture of Difference in Africa: Introduction to the Focus Section  
Laurent Fourchard / Aurelia Segatti (pp. 4 – 11)
“Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are!” Gendering Our Understanding of Kibera’s Post-election 
Violence Caroline Wanjiku Kihato (pp. 12 – 24)
A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 Daouda Gary-Tounkara (pp. 25 – 38)
Collective Mobilization and the Struggle for Squatter Citizenship: Rereading “Xenophobic” Violence in a South 
African Settlement Tamlyn Jane Monson (pp. 39 – 55)
Protecting the “Most Vulnerable”? The Management of a Disaster and the Making/Unmaking of Victims after 
the 2008 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa Lydie Cabane (pp. 56 – 71)
The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East Uriel Abulof / Ogen Goldman (pp. 72 – 89)
Group-based Compunction and Anger: Their Antecedents and Consequences in Relation to Colonial 
Conflicts Ana Figueiredo / Bertjan Doosje / Joaquim Pires Valentim (pp. 90 – 105)
The Secret Society of Torturers: The Social Shaping of Extremely Violent Behaviour  
Jürgen Mackert (pp. 106 – 120)
Validation of the Greek Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale: Examining Its 
Relationships with Sexist and Conservative Political Beliefs Alexandra Hantzi / Efthymios Lampridis / Katerina 
Tsantila / Gerd Bohner (pp. 121 – 133)
Open Section
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015, pp. 72 – 89
Abulof and Goldman: The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East  73
The democratic peace theory has two complementary variants regarding intrastate conflicts: the “democratic civil peace” thesis sees democratic regimes as 
pacifying internal tensions; the “anocratic war” thesis submits that due to nationalism, democratizing regimes breed internal violence. This paper statistically 
tests the two propositions in the context of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We show that a MENA democracy makes a country more 
prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democracy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to 
experience violent intrastate strife. Interestingly, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Looking for causality 
beyond correlation, we suggest that “democratizing nationalism” might be a long-term prerequisite for peace and democracy, not just an immediate hin-
drance. We also advise complementing current research on intrastate and interstate clashes with the study of intercommunal conflicts and the democratic 
features of non-state polities.
Kant’s vision of moving “toward perpetual peace” stands at 
the crux of liberal thought in International Relations (IR), 
positing democracy, open trade, and international institu-
tions as peace promoters. Though these liberal mechanisms 
intertwine (Doyle, 2005), democratic peace theories (DPT) 
now constitute “a powerful discursive core of con-
temporary conflict research,” quantitatively dominating 
this field (Sillanpää and Koivula 2010, 148).
Can the contemporary realities of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) inform this rich research program? 
Recent surveys among North American IR scholars reveal 
that while DPT is overwhelmingly considered the most pro-
ductive IR research program (Maliniak et al. 2007, 29), 
MENA, though held as the most strategically important area 
to the United States, receives the least published attention in 
the field (Maliniak et al. 2011, 459). MENA appears to defy 
many political theories, and coupling DPT with MENA, the 
least democratic region of the world, seems senseless.
The Arab Spring, however, calls for rethinking (Gause 
2011). Whatever its causes and outcomes, the regional tur-
moil is likely to further an already remarkable “elec-
toralization,” resulting in the holding of more and more fair 
and free elections. Indeed, while MENA has been all but 
absent from the third wave of democratization, in the past 
generation it has gone through seeming liberalization and 
intense electoralization ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Lust-Okar 
and Zerhouni 2008). Evident setbacks in the late 1990s not-
withstanding, recent years have seen an unprecedented 
number of fairly fair and free elections in the region, osten-
sibly giving voice to the people through votes and high-
lighting the need to reassess the possible relationship 
between ballots and bullets in the region.
This paper focuses on one particular aspect of DPT: its 
application to the domestic sphere. Domestic democratic 
peace theories (DDPT) examine whether the pacifying 
effects of democracy apply not only in the interstate sphere 
but to the intrastate sphere as well. Several authors suggest 
that democracy provides peaceful ways of ameliorating 
domestic tensions before they escalate to violence, engen-
dering a “democratic civil peace” of sorts ([pic]Krain and 
Myers 1997; Rummel 1984; Rummel 1985; Stockemer 
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2010). Others submit that democratizing (anocratic) states 
breed violence, due to nationalism (Mansfield and Snyder 
2005). Either way, DDPT seems especially relevant to the 
study of MENA, for the main source of political violence in 
the region does not lie in interstate strife. To wit, we seek to 
analyze the applicability of DDPT to MENA, not to estab-
lish the possibility of domestic democratic peace itself.
We show that rather than producing a “democratic civil 
peace,” democracies in MENA seem statistically disposed 
to greater domestic political violence. Contrary to the 
“anocratic thesis,” semi-democracies in the region do not 
show a significant propensity to domestic violence. We sug-
gest that “democratizing nationalism” might actually be a 
long-term prerequisite of democratic peace, not just an 
immediate hindrance. We also advise transcending the stat-
ist perspective that underlies the typical DPT typology of 
interstate and intrastate conflicts, in order to examine 
intercommunal conflicts as well as the democratic features 
of non-state polities.
1. Democratic Peace Theories
DPT is one of the more prolific and high-profile political 
theories of our time, and has made substantial strides since 
its inception, becoming more nuanced, robust, and diverse 
(Chan 2009). DPT’s “T” now stands for a plurality of often-
conflicting theories. Its research program deals with both 
interstate and intrastate relations and spans three promi-
nent models: monadic, dyadic, and anocratic.
Monadic DPT holds that democracies are more pacific 
(Ferejohn and McCall Rosenbluth 2008) and less likely to 
engage in severe war (Rummel 1995) or to initiate and 
escalate military threats (Huth and Allee 2002, 281) than 
other non-democratic states. Conversely, dyadic DPT holds 
that it takes two to tango the democratic peace, as democ-
racies rarely, if ever, fight one another ([pic]Ray 1995; Rus-
sett 1993; Weart 1998). Even if extended beyond large-scale 
wars, to both crises and militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs) (Beck et al. 1998), dyadic DPT seems robust 
([pic]Dafoe 2011; Oneal and Russett 2001). However, 
recent studies cast doubt as to whether it is democracy that 
causes peace or in fact the other way around, or both 
(Rasler and Thompson, 2005); perhaps the link is spurious, 
and militarized rivalry and severe territorial disputes 
hinder both peace and democracy ([pic]Gibler and Tir 
2010; Miller and Gibler 2011).
DPT’s third and youngest progeny is the anocratic model. 
Anocracies are in-between regimes, neither autocracies nor 
democracies. In Electing to Fight, Mansfield and Snyder 
(2005, 76–77) follow the Polity Score (see below) to identify 
as anocratic those regimes where the constraints on the 
executive are “more than ‘slight’ but less than ‘substantial’,” 
often with “dual executives, in which a hereditary ruler shares 
authority with an appointed or elected governing minister.” 
They are specifically interested in democratizing anocracies, 
whose transitions they measure over a five-year period, and 
propose that because emerging democracies tend to 
engender strong nationalism and weak political institutions, 
they engage in political violence more frequently than either 
democracies or autocracies (see also Sandeep et al. 2009). 
Although heavily contested (for example Narang and Nelson 
2009), anocratic DPT is widely noted and highly influential.
DPT’s three main models are predominantly about inter-
state relations (Hook 2010). However, responding to the 
saliency of non-interstate violence, scholars increasingly 
extend the DPT research program to intrastate conflicts. 
DDPT imports insights from the interstate models into two 
main theses. The “democratic civil peace” thesis, reflecting 
dyadic and monadic rationales, postulates that democracies 
are much less inclined to descend into civil war ([pic]Gle-
ditsch et al. 2009; Krain and Myers 1997; Rummel 1984, 
1985; Stockemer 2010).
The “anocratic war” thesis holds that anocracies are the 
most prone to suffer from internal, as well as external, viol-
ent strife. While some scholars go so far as to argue that 
elections may fuel political violence in both democratizing 
and well-established democracies (Rapoport and Weinberg 
2001), most scholars connect internal violence only to 
incipient democracies. Snyder (2000) submits that when 
“liberty is leading people,” intrastate violence often follows: 
premature democratization ignites nationalism and con-
sequently political violence, frequently ethnic and civil 
wars. As in the interstate version of anocratic DPT, here too 
nationalism reigns as the violence-inducing factor.
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These two compelling theses are part of a rather coherent 
research effort, and are not mutually exclusive (for a thor-
ough review of the literature, see Gleditsch and Hegre 
2014). They can effectively converge on a joint question: 
Does democratization breed or stem internal political viol-
ence? Is there a threshold beyond which democratization 
stops yielding anocratic violence and starts fostering civil 
democratic peace? Hegre et al. (2001, 44) hold that “if we 
focus on countries that are at least half-way toward com-
plete democracy, the prospects for domestic peace are 
promising” (see also [pic]Cederman et al. 2010; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, the 
nature of this “magical mid-point” remains elusive.
There are partial remedies. For example, not all civil wars 
are the same, and governmental/territorial motivations 
may correlate distinctively with regime type. Buhaug (2006, 
691) finds that “the reputed parabolic relationship between 
democracy and risk of civil war only pertains to state-
centered conflicts, whereas democracy has a positive and 
near-linear effect on the risk of territorial rebellion.” Gle-
ditsch et al. (2009) confirm this proposition, and per-
suasively show that democracies are less prone to violence, 
also due to higher income and stable institutions.
The linkage between anocracy and political instability is 
pivotal. When the latter is controlled for, some studies 
evince the parabolic relationship between democracy and 
risk of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001). However, since political 
instability could be a consequence of anocracy and a mech-
anism for explaining conflict, it may not be appropriate to 
control for it (Gleditsch et al. 2009). Generally, studies 
omitting political instability show a positive relationship 
between anocracy and conflict.
2. Votes and Violence in the Middle East
Can various DPT models, DDPT included, apply to 
MENA? Few studies attempt to look at DPT, let alone 
DDPT, from a regional perspective (cf. [pic]Gibl, 2012; Gle-
ditsch 2002; Kacowicz 1998), and fewer focus on MENA. 
There seems to be good reasons for this. Prime facie, DPT 
and MENA are a highly unlikely match. After all, in a 
region largely inhospitable to democratic ideas and prac-
tices, chances for democratic peace seem slim. Up until the 
Arab Spring, Arab authoritarianism – whether autocratic 
or monarchic – had withstood domestic challenges for four 
long decades, making MENA an attractive “control case” for 
theories of democratization ([pic]Anderson 2001; Saikal 
and Schnabel 2003) but an unlikely candidate for testing 
DPT.
DPT, as an increasingly statistics-driven research program, 
typically finds data on democracies in MENA a non-starter 
for dedicated research: “[T]he small variance in the inde-
pendent or explanatory variable (the democratic nature of 
regimes) hinders our ability to estimate the effects on the 
dependent variable (conflict or cooperation)” (Solingen 
2003, 44). Democratic peace per se appears irrelevant to 
MENA’s history. Thus, most scholarship addressing democ-
racy and MENA sidesteps DPT and prefers to explicate the 
“democracy lag/gap/deficiency ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; 
Springborg 2007) or its flipside, “enduring auth-
oritarianism” ([pic]Bellin 2004; Schlumberger 2007).
There are few exceptions to this rule. Several scholars and 
regime-type datasets note MENA’s modest liberalization/
electoralization from the mid-1970s until about 1993 
([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Ehteshami 1999; Freedom House 
2014; Salamé 1994). This trend (Figure 2 below) and the 
heyday of the Arab-Israeli peace process toward the 
mid-1990s produced some optimistic assessments. Maoz 
(1995, 179) argued that “levels of hostility in the Arab-
Israeli conflict are affected by changes in domestic political 
systems. The move toward democracy by these states 
reduces the intensity of conflict interaction.” Tessler and 
Grobschmidt (1995, 163) even predicted that “the overall 
effect of political liberalization and democracy would be 
much more positive than negative with respect to the Arab-
Israeli conflict.” If so, Russett (1993, 134) noted, MENA is 
one place in particular where a “threat to the theory and 
the reality of ‘democracies don’t go to war with each other’ 
lurks,” since once Arab states achieve democracy, the Arab-
Israeli conflict may eclipse, and thus theoretically chal-
lenge, dyadic DPT.
Conversely, Hudson (1995, 217) held that “the Arab (and 
Arab/Israeli) cases do not clearly indicate a clear relation-
ship between regime structure (‘democracy’) and foreign 
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policy behavior [. . .] to the extent that there might be such 
a relationship, these cases suggest that ‘democratic’ struc-
tures might be less ‘peace-prone’ than authoritarian struc-
tures.” Similarly, Solingen (2003, 58) concluded that “even a 
minimalist, relaxed version of the democratic peace 
hypothesis cannot explain the big strides toward a more 
peaceful region made in the early 1990s.”
The scarcity of DPT scholarship on MENA is unfortunate. 
After all, it “make[s] more sense to study the causes of war 
and peace among dyads in war-prone parts of the world” 
(Goldsmith 2006, 547). In particular, the interplay between 
votes and violence in MENA during the last generation 
presents fascinating challenges and opportunities for dedi-
cated DPT research on the region. As the least democratic 
and nearly the most violent region worldwide, a democra-
tizing MENA may put DPT to an important test – and may 
call for theoretical and methodological rethinking. While 
democratic peace may be missing from MENA, MENA is 
conversely, and regrettably, missing from theorizing on 
democratic peace. Coupling these theories with regional 
practice, while taxing, may benefit our understanding of 
both. Ultimately, for DPT to inform Mideast studies, Mid-
east studies must first inform DPT.
A brief exposition of conflict and democracy in MENA 
should help set the stage for the statistical investigation. 
Historically, MENA has been a violent neighborhood. 
Although the worldwide drop in the number of conflicts 
began in MENA at the beginning of the 1980s, it remains 
(increasingly), one of the most politically violent regions in 
the world. Among the world’s twenty-five most war-prone 
countries since 1946, eight are Middle Eastern. Since the 
1980s, MENA battle-deaths (as opposed to number of dis-
crete conflict) have been on par with the most deadly 
zones, Central and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
with the latter becoming the most conflict-prone and 
deadly by the turn of the twenty-first century. Likewise, 
since the 1980s MENA has shared with Southern Asia the 
first place among regions plagued by political terror 
(Human Security Centre 2014).
Recently, the situation has further deteriorated. “The 
Middle East/Persian Gulf and Latin America lead all other 
regions both in terms of total attacks and fatalities, while 
the former has replaced the latter as the most active ter-
rorist region in the world over time” (Hewitt et al. 2010, 
22). From 2002 onwards, there was a sharp increase in 
violent campaigns against civilians in MENA, notably in 
Sudan, Iraq, and Syria. The other regions showed no clear 
trends. MENA’s share of worldwide non-state conflict 
battle-deaths has increased substantially, now amounting 
to about a quarter of the total deaths due to non-state 
conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). The Arab 
Spring has accelerated the rise of political violence in 
MENA along three fronts: fighting between government 
forces and rebel groups (state-based conflict), clashes 
between non-state groups (non-state conflict), and deadly 
assaults against civilians (one-sided violence), such as the 
violent suppression of protests and demonstrations (see 
Figure 1).
Figure 1: Reported deaths from organized violence in the Middle East and 
North Africa, 1989–2011
Source: Human Security Centre 2014, 82.
MENA’s surfeit of political violence is matched by its 
dearth of democracy. In assessing the Mideast democratic 
gap, datasets generally converge. Freedom House (FH) 
(2014) regards Israel as the only “free country” in MENA 
since 1976; in 2014, six countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia) were ranked as “partly free,” 
while the rest of the MENA states (66 percent; 83 percent 
of the population) are “not free,” significantly surpassing 
sub-Saharan Africa (with “only” 41 percent of countries, 
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and 35 percent of the population, denoted as “not free”). 
The overall average score of FH for MENA (on a 1 to 7 
scale, 1 being the most free) has changed little since the 
index began in 1971. The decline in autocracies from the 
mid-1970s to the early 1990s (and again in the mid-2000s, 
and in the wake of the Arab Spring) mainly bred anoc-
racies, not democracies.1 MENA also remains the strong-
hold of hereditary monarchies. The Arab Spring has thus 
far yield a similar effect (see Figure 2).2
discrimination inevitably follows: “For most of the last half-
century a larger proportion of minorities has suffered from 
governmentally sanctioned discrimination in MENA than 
in any other world region […] What is especially unique in 
this region is the lack of any real movement toward 
remedial actions for disadvantaged groups” (Marshall and 
Gurr, 2005, 42).
3. Testing Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East
Sørli et al. (2005) provide the most comprehensive attempt 
to-date to quantitatively explain MENA’s patterns of war 
and peace. Testing the various hypotheses of the Collier-
Hoeffler model of civil war in MENA (1960–2000), the 
authors also pay attention to regime-type. They confirm 
the curvilinear relationship democracy and conflict (both 
internal and internationalized internal), suggesting that 
“the high level of authoritarianism cannot by itself 
account for the high level of conflict in the Middle East” 
(Sørli et al. 2005, 156). Our study, which is dedicated to the 
effects of regime-types, complement this important work 
by updating it (up to 2007), thus including key recent 
events – such as 9/11, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the col-
lapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – and their 
vast implications on both “electoralization” and domestic 
violence in the region. We also include additional vari-
ables, such as the incidence (not only onset) of civil wars, 
and test democracy with another dataset (Freedom 
House).
Scholars still dispute the best way to estimate the effect of 
regime type on the probability of conflict. We used binary 
logistic cross-sectional time-series analysis for our dataset 
(employing AR1). Beck et al. (1998) propose that binary 
time-series cross-sectional studies should create a variable 
of the years elapsed since the last dispute. We also follow 
the GEE method advocated by Oneal and Russett (1999, 
2001), and Carter and Signorino (2010), in incorporating 
squared and cubed polynomials for peace years.
Figure 2: Trends in freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, 
1974–2014
Source: Freedom House 2014.
The Economist’s 2012 Democracy Index (2013) suggests that 
in 2012 Libya, Egypt, and Morocco transitioned from auth-
oritarian to hybrid regimes, but twelve of twenty MENA 
countries are still ruled by authoritarian leaders. The Polity 
IV Index (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) likewise ranks 
MENA as the region with the lowest share of democracies 
(currently, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey), the highest 
number of autocracies, and about the same proportion of 
anocracies as in Central and Southern Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. According to the Minorities at Risk project, 
1 According to Freedom House, MENA autocracies 
becoming “partly free” include Algeria (1989–1992), 
Bahrain (1976–1993), Egypt (1975–1993), Iran 
(1979–1981, 1984–88), Jordan (1985–2010), Kuwait 
(1992–), Lebanon (1976–1989, 1992–95, 2006–), 
Libya (2013-)-, Qatar (1977–1989, Sudan 
(1979–1989) Syria (1978–1980), Tunisia 
(1979–1993, 2012-.), UAE (1977–1990), (North) 
Yemen (1984–1993).
2 Figure 2 excludes Polyarchy, as the latter lacks full 
data on some countries (such as Lebanon, Yemen), 
and does not go beyond the year 2000. Compared to 
FH, in Polyarchy the anocratic fluctuation is more 
moderate; about 85 percent of MENA countries are 
consistently autocratic.
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The selection of datasets for investigating DDPT is quite 
intricate. Both Polity IV and Correlates of War (COW) cur-
rently seem to provide sub-optimal data for this analysis. 
Scholarship is increasingly critical of Polity’s “serious 
endogeneity and measurement problems” (Cederman et al. 
2010, 377), holding that “skepticism as to the precision of 
the Polity democracy scale is well founded” (Treier and 
Jackman 2008, 201). Polity’s faults are particularly troubling 
in the case of anocratic DPT and DDPT (Vreeland 2008).
In light of Polity’s problems, we opted to use two alter-
natives: Freedom House and Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy 
(version 2.0). We recoded FH composite ranking of political 
rights and civil liberties (each scoring 1 to 7, jointly 2 to 14), 
so that our ranking starts with a composite score of 1 (the 
least democratic) to 13 (the most democratic), following the 
customary categorization of autocracy (1–4), anocracy (5–9) 
and democracy (10–13). Our categorical coding of Poly-
archy follows Ristei Gugiu and Centellas (2013). We added 
Mideast variables: first, a dummy variable (“MENA”), coding 
Mideast states;3 second, dummy variables for the three main 
regime-types (Democracy, Anocracy, Autocracy); third, a 
continuous variable coding MENA countries’ FH and Poly-
archy score (“Democracy MENA”; 0 for non-MENA states).
For the dependent variable of civil wars, UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2011, 1946–2010 (Themnér 
and Wallensteen, 2011) is preferable to COW. While COW 
focuses on interstate disputes (including wars) and large-
scale intrastate wars (excluding other types of violent con-
flicts), the UCDP/PRIO dataset includes all armed conflicts 
resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths. We 
coded, as binary variables, both the onset and the incidence 
of civil war. Recent works reasonably focus on onset, since 
causes for the initiation and the duration of such conflicts 
are arguably different (Gleditsch et al. 2009).
We followed Stockemer’s (2010) analysis of regime-type and 
civil wars from 1990 to 2007 on a state-year basis. Beyond 
the independent and dependent variables, this dataset con-
trols for time, employing the technique proposed by Beck et 
al. (1998); GDP per capita measures, taken from the World 
Bank data (in constant 2005 US dollars ); national GDP (in 
billion US dollars); the number of ethnic, religious, and/or 
linguistic groups constituting 5 percent or more of the popu-
lation; income inequality (based on Gini coefficient and 
clustered as a categorical variable, coded 0 for low inequality, 
1 for medium-high inequality, and 2 for the most unequal 
countries); and a dummy variable for small states (coded 1 
for a country with a population of 1.5 million or below). We 
hypothesize that the richer the country is, the fewer civil 
wars it experiences; that societal cleavages and inequalities 
increase the likelihood of internal unrest and political viol-
ence; and that small states, which are often more easily gov-
erned, are less prone to civil war (Stockemer 2010).
Cederman et al. (2013, 205) find that “access to state power 
is a pivotal factor strongly influencing both the risk for 
conflict and its duration.” Overall, exclusion from state 
power and horizontal inequality increase the risk of civil 
war onset. We thus added a control variable, coding the 
political exclusion and relative size of minorities, drawing 
on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 
2009). Following Gleditsch et. al. (2009), we did not control 
for political (in)stability.
We conducted two logistic regressions, using both regime-
type dummy variables (Table 1) and the degree of democ-
racy as a continuous variable (Table 2). In both tables, 
model 1 presents findings regarding world data and model 
2 controls for MENA. In both tables, MENA is a binary 
variable, coded 1 for MENA countries. In Table 1, MENA 
Democracy and MENA Anocracy are binary variables, 
coded 1 only for Mideast democracies and anocracies, 
respectively. In Table 2, MENA Democracy is coded 0 for 
non-MENA countries and spans the regime-type scale for 
MENA states. The Democracy variable applies worldwide, 
and is binary in Table 1 and continuous in Table 2.
3 MENA states include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
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Table 1: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war, 1990–2007
Variable
Democracy
Anocracy
Small state
Number of ethnic groups
Discriminated groups
Income inequality
GDP
GDP per capita
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
MENA
MENA democracy
MENA anocracy
Constant
N
Incidence
Freedom House
Model 1
-.317  
(.5317)
.275  
(.2854)
.297  
(.3516)
.103  
(.0695)
.468  
(.5307)
.016  
(.1476)
–3.663E-6  
(1.0472E-5)
.000*  
(6.8590E-5)
-.900***  
(.0988)
.043***  
(.0054)
-.001***  
(7.4445E-5)
1.089  
(.4661)
2.724**  
(1.0669)
-.044  
(.8769)
.047  
(.4943)
2071
Model 2
-.365  
(.5073)
.083  
(.2612)
.150  
(.3091)
.103  
(.0692)
.719  
(.5703)
.040  
(.1355)
–5.612E-6  
(1.0817E-5)
–5.072E-5*  
(2.8661E-5)
-.857***  
(.0986)
.040***  
(.0052)
-.001***  
(7.1823E-5)
.084  
(.4634)
2071
Polyarchy
Model 1
-.131  
(.4549)
.160  
(.4256)
.416  
(.3784)
.064  
(.0970)
.720  
(.6660)
.003  
(.1560)
–1.029E-5  
(1.2945E-5)
–9.857E-5  
(7.4593E-5)
-.960*** 
(.1424)
.048***  
(.0088)
-.001***  
(.0001)
.503  
(.5091)
2.585*** 
(.8674)
.478  
(.8618)
.252  
(.5226) 
1221
Model 2
.043  
(.4052)
.147  
(.3677)
.131  
(.3520)
.131  
(.3520)
.932  
(.6633)
.064  
(.1527)
–1.491E-5  
(1.3041E-5)
–4.646E-5  
(3.1802E-5)
-.981***  
(.1472)
.049***  
(.0089)
-.001***  
(.0001)
.184  
(.4882)
1221
Onset
Freedom House
Model 1
–1.031** 
(.4812)
-.362  
(.3017)
-.295  
(.3963)
.179**  
(.0893)
.303  
(.4642)
-.100  
(.1246)
5.253E-6  
(1.7116E-5)
–6.892E-5  
(5.1425E-5)
-.337***  
(.0764)
.016***  
(.0043)
.000***  
(6.0858E-5)
.247  
(.4565)
2.787***  
(.9153)
-.584  
(1.2787)
–1.886***  
(.5513)
1773
Model 2
–1.006**  
(.4215)
-.417  
(.2850)
-.279  
(.3849)
.165  
(.0859)
.311  
(.4475)
-.099  
(.1243)
2.550E-6  
(1.6347E-5)
–5.046E-5  
(3.3306E-5)
-.347***  
(.0737)
.016***  
(.0041)
.000***  
(5.9812E-5)
–1.775***  
(.5167)
1773
Polyarchy
Model 1a
–1.212**  
(.5464)
-.963  
(.6700)
-.274  
(.4595)
.071  
(.1149)
-.025  
(.6357)
-.202  
(.1522)
–1.884E-5  
(2.4780E-5)
–2.474E-5  
(3.4030E-5)
-.387***  
(.0948)
.019***  
(.0056)
.000***  
(8.5932E-5)
-.031  
(.5508)
2.062*  
(1.0570)
–1.114  
(.8102)
1034
Model 2
–1.057**  
(.4671)
-.953  
(.6539)
-.320  
(.4623)
.072  
(.1114)
.007  
(.6283)
-.195  
(.1501)
–2.080E-5  
(2.4703E-5)
–2.025E-5  
(2.9280E-5)
-.389***  
(.0944)
.019***  
(.0056)
.000***  
(8.5367E-5)
–1.120  
(.7732)
1034
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
a. The variables MENA anocracy and MENA autocracy were omitted from this model because Hessian matrix singularity is caused by these parameters.
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Table 2: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war (degree of democracy as a continuous variable), 1990–2007
Variable
Democracy
Small state
Number of ethnic groups
Discriminated groups
Income inequality
GDP
GDP per capita
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
MENA
MENA democracy
Constant
N
Incidence
Freedom House
Model 1
-.012  
(.0522)
.196  
(.3014)
.101  
(.0675)
.557  
(.5509)
-.024  
(.1469)
–4.759E-006  
(9.6781E-006)
.000**  
(5.5157E-005)
-.897***  
(.1001)
.043***  
(.0054)
-.001***  
(7.5422E-005)
.250  
(.6876)
.222*  
(.1225)
.237  
(.5026)
2071
Model 2
-.029  
(.0484)
.066  
(.2761)
.105  
(.0682)
.693  
(.5744)
.020  
(.1338)
–4.053E-006  
(1.0510E-005)
–5.496E-005*  
(2.9786E-005)
-.850***  
(.0985)
.040***  
(.0052)
.000***  
(7.1391E-005)
.257  
(.4910)
2071
Polyarchy
Model 1
-.001  
.0186
.402  
.3731
.057  
.0964
.745  
.6561
-.005  
.1565
–1.125E-005  
(1.2988E-005)
.000  
(8.4403E-005)
-.946***  
(.1432)
.047***  
(.0088)
-.001***  
(.0001)
.322  
(.5766(
.081**  
(.0317)
.283  
(.5502)
1221
Model 2
.009  
(.0155)
.140  
(.3513)
.075  
(.0947)
1.000  
(.6597)
.059  
(.1519)
–1.533E-005  
(1.3304E-005)
–5.584E-005*  
(3.3189E-005)
-.986***  
(.1491)
.049***  
(.0090)
-.001***  
(.0001)
.128  
(.5132)
1221
Onset
Freedom House
Model 1
-.086*  
(.0481)
-.345  
(.3662)
.166*  
(.0902)
.328  
(.4713)
-.111  
(.1236)
9.703E-007  
(1.5028E-005)
–6.743E-005  
(4.5345E-005)
-.340***  
(.0788)
.016***  
(.0045)
.000***  
(6.5990E-005)
-.909  
(.7663)
.288**  
(.1317)
–1.575***  
(.5739)
1773
Model 2
-.082*  
(.0421)
-.353  
(.3642)
.167*  
(.0892)
.332  
(.4619)
-.103  
(.1254)
3.641E-006  
(1.5866E-005)
–5.509E-005  
(3.6612E-005)
-.349***  
(.0742)
.017***  
(.0042)
.000***  
(6.1238E-005)
1773
Polyarchy
Model 1a
-.048**  
(.0223)
-.263  
(.4663)
.075  
(.1104)
-.118  
(.6587)
-.194  
(.1520)
–1.656E-005  
(2.4438E-005)
–2.161E-005  
(3.5854E-005)
-.381***  
(.0994)
.019***  
(.0059)
.000***  
(8.9362E-005)
-.338  
(.6410)
.087**  
(.0346)
–1.029  
(.7899)
1034
Model 2
-.037**  
(.0185)
-.313  
(.4671)
.080  
(.1074)
-.025  
(.6466)
-.176  
(.1499)
–1.901E-005  
(2.4009E-005)
–1.927E-005  
(2.8430E-005)
-.399***  
(.0985)
.020***  
(.0058)
.000***  
(8.8584E-005)
–1.109  
(.7491)
1034
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Our findings – across all models, datasets, and tables – sug-
gest that being a MENA democracy makes a country more 
prone to the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democ-
racy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a 
MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent 
intrastate strife (Table 2). Conversely, with both FH and 
Polyarchy, democracies worldwide are significantly less 
prone to civil war onset, in either a binary or a scale measure 
(Tables 1 and 2). Anocracies do not seem to be predisposed 
to civil wars, either worldwide or in MENA (Table 1).
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To further validate our surprising findings regarding the 
anocratic effect on civil war, we inserted the control vari-
ables to the statistical models incrementally. With FH, the 
anocratic effect is insignificant throughout, even in the 
univariate model (with just the anocracy variable). With 
Polyarchy, controlling for time dependency by peace-years 
polynomials eliminates the significant effect of anocracy. 
The discrepancy with previous studies (see above) might 
be the result of the latter using Polity, not FH and Poly-
archy, as well as of our control for time dependence using 
peace-years polynomials.
4. Discussion
MENA’s apparent aberration is rather easy to dismiss. First, 
these findings do not statistically refute the global observa-
tion. Second, MENA’s (and Israel’s) alleged exceptionalism 
is readily available to explain away this outlier. Supposedly, 
since this region is so out of sync with the rest of the politi-
cal world, its apparently odd behavior should come as no 
surprise and have little theoretical or methodological bear-
ing on DPT. It is thus rather safe to “save” DPT from 
MENA anomaly.
However, such “defensive” moves expose DPT’s theoretical 
fragility, evincing yet again that “no experimental result can 
ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counter 
instances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suit-
able reinterpretation of its terms” (Lakatos 1970, 116). 
Choosing a less safe path, however daunting, may be more 
rewarding – to both DPT’s research program and its actual 
utility. While we may settle for ad hoc “defensive” solutions 
to apparent outliers, we should consider “progressive prob-
lemshift,” breaking new theoretical and methodological 
ground when empirically needed. Below, we provide two 
suggestions on how to draw upon DPT analysis of MENA 
to enrich both our theoretical tools and our empirical 
understanding.
4.1. The Vices and Virtues of Nationalism
The statistical findings above suggest, and the Arab Spring 
clearly demonstrates, that popular calls for democracy, 
even the execution of free and fair election, do not guaran-
tee civil peace, and often precipitate violence. The puzzle, 
however, is causation, not correlation. Mansfield and 
Snyder (2009, 381) explain that “nationalism is a key causal 
mechanism linking incomplete democratization to both 
civil and international war.” This inference is not without 
merits, but we argue that it might go the other way around: 
the subversion of nationalism, from within and without, 
can turn democratization violent.
MENA regimes have since the 1950s invested heavily in 
“state-building,” especially in the bureaucracy and the coer-
cive apparatus (Ayubi 1996). Much less attention was giv-
ing to “nation-building,” fostering civil solidarity, and 
making the “the people” as the paramount source of politi-
cal legitimacy (Connor 1972). However, when state-build-
ing comes at the expense of nation-building it may breed 
rather than hinder violence. Moreover, a viable nation, not 
just state, is often a prerequisite for progressive democratiz-
ation: turning a procedural democracy (holding a free and 
fair election) into a substantive democracy (allowing for 
peaceful ousting of powerful incumbents), though not 
necessarily a liberal one.
While some anocracies go to war, others do not. Indeed, as 
Mansfield and Snyder (2009,383, 381) acknowledge, 
“numerous countries have democratized peacefully over 
the past two decades in Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
East Asia, and South Africa.” What then makes certain 
democratizing states violently unstable? They point to two 
sources: strong nationalism and a weak state. “The com-
bination of increasing mass political participation and 
weak political institutions creates the motive and the 
opportunity for both rising and declining elites to play the 
nationalist card in an attempt to rally popular support 
against domestic and foreign rivals.” They define national-
ism as a doctrine that “holds that the people as a whole 
have the right to self-rule,” and that, as such, “can be used to 
convince newly empowered constituencies that the cleav-
age between the privileged and the masses is unimportant 
compared to the cleavages that divide nations, ethnic 
groups, or races” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 2).
This description drives prescription, which stands at the 
core of the ongoing dispute regarding the US’s democratiz-
ation policy in MENA and beyond ([pic]Savun and Tirone 
2011; Wittes 2008). Since coherent institutions, such as a 
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functioning bureaucracy and a sound legal system, enable 
states to democratize more peacefully and successfully, 
Mansfield and Snyder (2007, 5) hold that “efforts to pro-
mote democracy should try to follow a sequence of build-
ing institutions before encouraging mass competitive 
elections. Democratizing in the wrong sequence not only 
risks bloodshed in the short term, but also the mobilization 
of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block demo-
cratic consolidation over the long term.” Furthermore, 
since “democratizing nationalism” paves the “pathways to 
war,” taming, and if possible terminating, nationalism is key 
to peace ([pic]Mansfield and Snyder 2009; Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005, 260). Only after these two projects of state-
building and nation-taming succeed should we advance 
along the democratization sequence and encourage mass 
political participation and elections.
Mansfield and Snyder’s rationale is wanting. First, most 
autocrats are reluctant to encourage the building of institu-
tions that may eventually cause their downfall. To be sure, 
Tilly’s thesis of the “bellicist” origins of European state-
building carries considerable weight in the postcolonial 
world as well. Threats to regimes, either from ongoing 
interstate rivalry (Thies 2004) or from homegrown trans-
national insurgent groups (Kisangani and Pickering 2014) 
have motivated regimes to invest in certain aspects of state-
building. The emerging state institutions, however, are 
often not particularly conducive to democracy. As 
Carothers argues (2007a, 19–20; see also 2007b): “Outside 
East Asia, autocratic governments in the developing world 
have a terrible record as builders of competent, impartial 
institutions . . . if the higher standard is indeed the con-
trolling one, India probably still belongs in the sequentialist 
waiting room, not yet ready for elections. So too, for that 
matter, does Italy – a rather curious result.”
Second, Mansfield and Snyder seem to argue that anoc-
racies in particular are prone to dangerous greed (that is, 
actors utilizing weak institutions to gain domestic domi-
nance) and creed (actors leveraging nationalism to wage 
diversionary war). To the extent that anocracies are the 
least stable regime-types (Gurr 1974), they obviously pres-
ent political agents with structural opportunities to wreak 
havoc. It is not clear, however, whether democratization 
drives anocracies’ seeming instability, or whether the latter 
is simply a feature of some of these in-between regimes 
(see above). After all, a politically unstable regime is often a 
violently unstable regime. Moreover, as Narang and Nelson 
(2009, 360) argue, incomplete democratizers with weak 
institutions should ostensibly be too weak to initiate or 
participate in interstate wars, and are thus prone to 
imploding, not exploding. Still, as Hegre et al. (2001, 33) 
note, “intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, 
even when they have had time to stabilize from regime 
change.”
Third, taming nationalism may backfire. Granted, national-
ism has often been abused as a modern call to arms. How-
ever, modern nationalism’s core values can provide 
common moral ground for managing and resolving dis-
putes. Modern nationalism subscribes to “the people” as 
legitimating both polity and authority through the pre-
scriptive principles of self-determination and popular sov-
ereignty, respectively (Yack 2012). We may debate whether 
the rise of the Rousseauian social contract at the expense of 
the Hobbesian has benefited world order and peace, but 
either way that national genie has long been out of the 
bottle.
The clash between the state Leviathan and the will of “the 
people” is not inevitable – nations have engendered states 
as much as the other way around. Still, numerous peoples 
worldwide have come to believe that there is a mismatch 
between the borders of their state and the boundaries their 
nation as well as between their regime’s interests and their 
own.
Ethnicity plays a key role in these dynamics. If a multi-
ethnic society comes together as “a people” and then a 
nation, prospects for state-building, democracy, and 
domestic peace are promising. If, however, nationalism is 
largely ethnic, then “the existence of a core ethnic group 
that had served as the basis for a relatively long-standing 
political community in the past” may become paramount 
in state-building (Taylor and Botea 2008). Moreover, with-
out such a demographically dominant and highly politi-
cized ethnic core, democratization may unleash ethnic 
rivalries that will undermine it. A middle road of a multi-
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ethnic but nationless state, which allows for power-sharing 
between its groups, is appealing. So far, however, its record, 
especially in MENA, has been quite poor (see Lebanon, 
Iraq). It fostered meager state-building, democracy and 
domestic peace.
Against this background we should realize why “state-
to-nation imbalance” – the incongruence between state 
borders and national, often ethnic, boundaries – has often 
precipitated both external and internal violence (Miller 
2007). Importantly, how violent the national quest to 
resolve this mismatch would be is up to the concerned 
societies – regimes and peoples alike – and the inter-
national (or rather interstate) society at large. Taming 
nationalism – through coercion, expediency, and propriety 
– may turn it violent, but does not indicate that national-
ism itself is.
Finally, nationalism’s call for popular sovereignty may often 
be a socio-moral precondition for fostering viable democ-
racy. Undermining the national project, even if possible, 
also undermines the existence of “a people” on whose 
behalf the call for political participation and representation 
is made – indeed, on whose behalf the state, in the first 
place, exists. This realization drives Rustow’s (1970, 350) 
well-known yet still often overlooked conclusion that 
democratization is predicated on “a single background con-
dition – national unity . . . the vast majority of citizens in a 
democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reserva-
tions as to which political community they belong to.” 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 4) begin their Electing to Fight 
by drawing on Rustow’s seminal article, lamenting that his 
ideas “have not, however, played a central role in much sub-
sequent scholarship or public policymaking on democratic 
transitions.” Curiously, they then misinterpret Rustow’s key 
argument as “democratic transitions are most successful 
when strong political institutions are developed before 
popular political participation increases” (Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005, 3).
Rustow’s emphasis, however, is on national identity, not on 
state institutions. Indeed, in a later article (1990, 82) he again 
insists that “an unquestioned sense of national and terri-
torial identity is a highly favorable precondition” for democ-
ratization. Possibly, then, it is precisely the incongruence 
between state borders and national (often ethno-linguistic) 
identities that has hampered democratization in Africa and 
the Arab Middle East: “The colonial boundaries inherited by 
tropical Africa have created few states with linguistic unity 
or even linguistic majorities; and amid this scarcity of clear 
territorial-national identities it is no coincidence that Africa 
is the region where progress toward democracy has 
remained most precarious” (Rustow 1990, 84).
Until the Arab Spring, “democratizing nationalisms” in 
MENA arose largely outside the Arab world – in Turkey, 
Israel, and Iran. It remains to be seen whether the Arab 
Spring will usher in long-term “democratizing national-
isms.” This much may be hinted by the demonstration’s 
popular slogan: “The people want(s) bring down the 
regime.” While most observers have focused on the slogan’s 
ending – the negative (de)legitimation of the regime – we 
must also be attentive to the seemingly redundant but 
possibly pivotal preceding words: the positive affirmation 
of “the people,” as a singular agent, with the right to tell, 
morally and politically, right from wrong (Abulof, forth-
coming). This may, in the long run, engender sustainable 
democracies in MENA. The key question is whether pro-
gressive “democratizing nationalism” will be better served 
by keeping states like Syria and Iraq intact or by allowing 
them to dissolve, “desecrating” the century-old borders 
charted by Britain and France.
4.2. From Interstate and Intrastate to Intercommunal DPT
Scholarship on DPT has made important strides, and its 
ongoing controversies reflect its vitality. Until recently, 
however, DPT scholarship was “caught in the ‘territorial 
trap,’” as both democracy and war/peace are understood in 
terms of the territorial sovereign state (Barkawi and Laffey 
1999, 413; see also Barkawi and Laffe, 2001). Fortunately, 
new interventions reveal the merits of group-level research 
on intrastate conflict ([pic]Buhaug et al. 2014; Cederman et 
al. 2013). Our study underscores this move, demonstrating 
the importance of non-statist accounts.
DPT’s statism engenders two acute problems. First, trans-
posing interstate DPT to civil wars hardly exhausts the 
many variations of non-interstate violence. This is of par-
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ticular importance in MENA, where many non-interstate 
armed conflicts are cross-border and the warring parties 
are often not the citizens of the same state, or are even 
stateless (for example the PLO-Hamas rivalry. These viol-
ent clashes defy the neat typology of interstate and intras-
tate conflicts; they are better depicted as intercommunal 
conflicts. Even datasets with nuanced typology occasionally 
misclassify or overlook these conflicts. The UCDP/PRIO 
armed conflicts dataset, for example, classifies the 2006 
Lebanon War as an “internal armed conflict,” similar to the 
violent clash between the Egyptian government and 
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the radical Islamic opposition 
group in the country. However, whereas the latter was a 
clear domestic clash, the 2006 Lebanon War was waged 
between the state of Israel and a paramilitary organization 
based in an adjacent country, which became involved in the 
warfare. Conflation of the two blurs important conceptual 
boundaries. The UCDP/PRIO dataset also omits the Sep-
tember 1970 clash between Jordan and the PLO and the 
1982 Lebanon War – both resulted in thousands of casu-
alties – perhaps due to a lack of a fitting category.
Second, DPT’s extension to civil wars focuses on regime-
type, but does not address the democratic nature of the 
conflicting domestic parties. In other words, studies on the 
“domestic democratic peace” typically mix the levels of 
analysis, examining the effect of a state’s regime type on 
internal clashes rather than examining the democratic 
merits of the domestic rivals themselves. This preference is 
understandable, since most DPT literature is heavily quanti-
tative, and until recently there were no reliable datasets 
regarding the level of democracy of domestic political 
movements. Measuring this variable without referring to 
formal state institutions and laws is a daunting task. How-
ever, considering that the most robust DPT model is dyadic, 
not monadic, transposing its logic to the domestic level in a 
monadic form and on an incongruent level of analysis is 
odd. Few studies have evinced dyadic DPT’s merits for ana-
lyzing the relations between non-state actors, even before 
modernity (Crawford 1994; Ember et al. 1992). The time 
has come to take up this challenge to contemporary politics.
The Minorities at Risk Project (2008) has recently under-
taken to chart just that, beginning in MENA. According to 
its data, the number of ethnic organizations in MENA has 
grown steadily since the early 1980s, from about forty to 
about one hundred since the year 2000; and ideologically, 
since the early 1990s there has been a steady increase in 
the proportion of democratic organizations, emphasizing 
electoral politics and protests. While suffering from vari-
ous typological faults (for example coding the Hezbollah 
as advocating “democratic forms of government” for its 
participation in the Lebanese elections), this project 
opens new venues for future quantitative examination of 
DDPT.
5. Conclusions
Statistically testing DDPT in the MENA context, this paper 
showed that democratization has failed to bring domestic 
peace the Middle East. However, we proposed that “democ-
ratizing nationalism” might actually be a long-term pre-
requisite for democratic peace, not just an immediate 
hindrance, and that DPT needs to transcend the statist per-
spective in order to examine intercommunal conflicts as 
well as the democratic features of non-state polities. This 
paper also sought to encourage future mixed-method 
research in DPT scholarship, not least regarding MENA. 
Synthesizing quantitative and qualitative methods may 
pave paths to enrich DPT scholarship, improving our grasp 
of its definitions, data, and causation.
This article offered no definite answers, but put forward 
puzzles and guidelines to questions that are worth pur-
suing. Postulating nationalism as a possible precondition to 
viable democratization raises a thorny question: Do values 
function as an intervening variable between votes and viol-
ence, and if so how? The role of liberalism in facilitating 
the democratic peace has been richly studied (for example, 
[pic]Friedman 2008; Owen 1997). Conversely, nationalism, 
to the extent that it figures in DPT literature – mainly in 
the anocratic models – is typically regarded as hindering 
peace, which overlooks the potential pacifying role of 
national ideas and ideals.
To put it differently, in terms of Isaiah Berlin’s (2002) 
famous distinction between negative and positive liberties: 
Should the pacifying role of negative liberties (such as free-
dom of speech, press, and assembly) be complemented with 
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that of positive liberties, mainly popular sovereignty and 
the right of peoples to self-determination? Can a mutual 
adherence to the latter partly explain why democratic 
dyads are able to peacefully resolve their territorial dis-
putes? And, when such normative common ground is lack-
ing in countries holding free elections, can this lack partly 
explain their failure to reach a utilitarian middle-ground, 
or even their resort to a coercive battleground? Answering 
these questions, via discourse and content analyses as well 
as public opinion polls, may prove pivotal to advancing our 
understanding of DPT’s causality.
Finally, we may also want to look for answers to the big 
counterfactual questions that DPT models raise. Although 
the typical presentation of quantitative DPT studies is cor-
relational – seeking robust “covering laws” – the search for 
causality perforce presents us with “what if ” queries: For 
example, would a democratic Egypt have refrained from 
launching a surprise attack against Israel in 1973? Such 
counterfactual investigations are all the more important if 
we are to assess, and warily predict, how the changing 
political tides in the Middle East affect the region’s pros-
pects between war and “perpetual peace.”
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Supplemental Data and Results
Odds Ratios Findings
VARIABLES
Democracy1
Autocracy1
Small state1
Income inequalities
Ethnic groups #
GDP
GDP per capita
MENA1
Democracy MENA1
Autocracy MENA1
Peace years
Constant
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
 Observations
World
0.290***
(0.119)
0.884
(0.217)
0.172***
(0.0846)
0.996
(0.114)
1.146**
(0.0786)
1.473***
(0.131)
1.000***
(8.10e-05)
0.141***
(0.0380)
1.488
(0.598)
369.90
–587
0.488
2,711
World/MENA
0.303***
(0.126)
0.775
(0.181)
0.193***
(0.0968)
1.032
(0.120)
1.201***
(0.0773)
1.399***
(0.117)
1.000***
(7.86e-05)
2.124
(1.889)
7.409**
(7.341)
1.219
(1.156)
0.145***
(0.0389)
1.211
(0.439)
–574
0.499
2,711
Table 3: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war 
on the basis of regime type (semi-demo cracies as omitted group), 
comparing MENA and the World.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For space reasons estimates of splines are not presented. 
1dummy variable
VARIABLES
Democracy
Small state1
Income inequalities
Ethnic groups #
GDP
GDP per capita
MENA1
Democracy MENA1
Peace years
Constant
Log likelihood
Wald χ2
Pseudo R2
 Observations
World
0.908**
(0.0352)
0.164***
(0.0812)
1.006
(0.118)
1.144**
(0.0781)
1.437***
(0.140)
1.000***
(8.50e-05)
0.138***
(0.0371)
2.180*
(0.884)
–594
364.32
0.482
2,711
World/MENA
0.917**
(0.0389)
0.185***
(0.0928)
1.037
(0.127)
1.205***
(0.0773)
1.391***
(0.125)
1.000***
(8.17e-05)
0.856
(0.603)
1.262*
(0.155)
0.143***
(0.0382)
1.550
(0.570)
–581
361.27
0.494
2,711
Table 4: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war 
on the basis of regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), 
comparing MENA and the world.
1dummy variable
Column 1 in Table 3 shows that when we do not account 
for regional differences, the incidence of intrastate war in a 
democracy is one third as likely as the incidence of such a 
war in an anocracy (other things being equal). Autocracies, 
on the other hand, are not significantly (at 0.1 significance 
level) less prone to war than anocracies. This pattern is pre-
served when MENA variables are introduced in column 2. 
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When non-MENA states are considered (MENA = 0) the 
odds for a democratic state to be involved in a civil war is 
0.303 that of an anocratic state. Contrary to the worldwide 
tendency, however, MENA democracies are far more prone 
to intrastate wars than MENA anocracies. These results do 
not change dramatically when the level of democracy is 
measured as a continuous variable (Table 4). The inter-
action term in Table 4 is less significant (0.1 level), but this 
result still supports the conclusion that the relation between 
intrastate wars and democracy is positive in MENA states.4
GEE Findings:
Oneal and Russett argue that using general estimating 
equation (GEE) is preferable to Beck Katz and Tucker’s 
method. The results below show that using GEE with 
adjustment for first order autocorrelation (AR1) does not 
alter significantly the findings presented in the article. In 
addition to the AR1 adjustment, I also included the variable 
Year centered around 1885 in first two tables and around 
1990 in tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of 
regime type (semi-democracies as omitted group), comparing MENA and 
the World.
VARIABLES
Democracy
Autocracy
Year
Small state
Income inequalities
Ethnic groups #
GDP
GDP per capita
MENA
Democracy MENA
Autocracy MENA
Constant
Wald χ2
Observations
World
0.576**
(0.152)
1.163
(0.201)
0.963**
(0.0163)
0.0910***
(0.0497)
1.025
(0.162)
1.126
(0.0832)
1.116
(0.101)
1.000*
(8.25e-05)
0.316***
(0.126)
67.11
2711
World/MENA
0.533**
(0.162)
1.049
(0.195)
0.968**
(0.0157)
0.113***
(0.0619)
1.046
(0.173)
1.182**
(0.0877)
1.053
(0.0965)
1.000
(9.04e-05)
1.732
(1.625)
229.3***
(237.9)
1.461
(1.064)
0.266***
(0.110)
612.66
2711
Table 4: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of 
regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), comparing 
MENA and the world.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
VARIABLES
Democracy
Year
Small state
Income inequalities
Ethnic groups #
GDP
GDP per capita
MENA
Democracy MENA
Constant
Wald χ2
Observations
World
0.904***
(0.0341)
0.964**
(0.0163)
0.0981***
(0.0538)
1.028
(0.163)
1.124
(0.0845)
1.121
(0.1000)
1.000*
(8.01e-05)
0.553
(0.226)
63.96
2711
World/MENA
0.892***
(0.0389)
0.967**
(0.0155)
0.112***
(0.0620)
1.061
(0.175)
1.194**
(0.0905)
1.111
(0.0905)
1.000*
(8.04e-05)
0.473
(0.468)
1.422**
(0.222)
0.425**
(0.177)
74.93
2711
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4 Here too, I used Norton et al.’s (2004) inteff pro-
cedure to assess the significance of the interaction. 
The results show that the interaction effect is posi-
tive and significant for nearly the entire sample. The 
interaction is negative only for states with probabil-
ity of around 0.9 of engaging a civil war and for a 
very small proportion of states with probability of 
less than 0.1.
